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Abstract: This article outlines how Xi Jinping has exercised control 
over diplomatic actors, particularly China’s Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, and draws out the effects of this control for the ministry and for 
Chinese foreign policy. Leveraging Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of 
“field,” I demonstrate how Xi has – through processes of socialisa-
tion, restriction, and displays of fealty – bred local diplomatic field 
incentives in which actors exhibit more loyal, assertive, and disciplin-
ed behaviour. Next, I introduce the idea of “transversal disruption” – 
the potential of local fields to disrupt and introduce change on and in 
overlapping fields, and vice versa. Practice theorists have relatively 
little to say about inter-field effects, and this article seeks to fill this 
gap by showing how field rules in the transnational diplomatic space 
can change when fields meet. I illustrate the above through three 
cases of field encounters: the multilateral Track II diplomacy field; 
the transnational fields of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN); and, the China–Malaysia bilateral diplomatic field. 
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Much has been said about Xi Jinping’s centralisation and accretion of 
personal power and authority. However, comparatively little attention 
has been paid to the modality through which such power-accretion 
efforts are exercised and their implications for China’s foreign policy. 
This article1 takes two approaches to addressing this gap in the litera-
ture on contemporary Chinese foreign policy: First, focusing on Chi-
na’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), it examines how Xi has 
increased control over diplomatic actors. Second, it maps out what 
this accumulation of power means for the ministry and the effects of 
this on Chinese foreign policy. It argues that MOFA has been social-
ised into a more politically disciplined outfit that predisposes itself to 
robust diplomatic behaviour. Drawing on Bourdieu’s (1984) concep-
tion of “field,” I contend that we can profit from a more field-sensi-
tive account that recognises the productive and generative effects of 
fields. This robustness owes itself, then, to a transformation of the 
“diplomatic field” and the ministry itself rather than an unmediated 
Xi-directed assertiveness. In that way, the idea of “transversal disrup-
tion” becomes key – the potential of local fields to disrupt and intro-
duce change on and in overlapping fields, and vice versa. I argue that 
the domestic diplomatic field, through Xi’s strategies of socialisation, 
restriction, and displays of fealty, promotes and rewards diplomatic 
assertiveness.  
Furthermore, I suggest that at the point of field overlaps and 
embeddedness, the potential for disruption – and, consequently, 
change – is ever-present. I illustrate this through three cases of field 
encounters by Chinese diplomatic actors occurring within transna-
tional spaces. This is supplemented with a series of participant obser-
vations undertaken from 2013 to 2017 in Track II and official/semi-
official diplomatic settings, and 18 in-depth interviews with diplomat-
ic actors. The latter were conducted in Beijing (2016, 2017, 2018), 
Shanghai (2017), and London (2018). From the 18 interviews, nine 
were with non-Chinese diplomats, five with current and former 
MOFA officials, three with academics closely affiliated with MOFA, 

1 I would like to thank Jaakko Heiskanen, Ayse Zarakol, and K. C. Lin for their 
valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am grateful to Phil  
Entwistle, the reviewers, and the editorial team – particularly James Powell and 
Petra Brandt – for their suggestions and advice. All errors are my own. 
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and one with a student at the Chinese Foreign Affairs University 
(CFAU). Interviewing non-Chinese diplomats, who have had exten-
sive interactions with Chinese counterparts, is important because it 
allows me to triangulate data from MOFA sources. Moreover, non-
Chinese subjects are also often able to bring to attention diplomatic 
practices that Chinese envoys themselves may not be able to articu-
late. With regard to participant observation data, these were drawn 
from my experience working in a Singaporean think tank from 2013 
to 2015 where I was involved in Track II and Track 1.5 forums in-
volving Chinese interlocutors. I also leveraged participant observation 
data obtained in closed-door conferences held in 2016 and 2017 in 
Beijing by CFAU, where I had the chance to directly interact with 
MOFA officials at their headquarters and observe their press confer-
ences.  
This analysis is important for two principal reasons. First, Xi has 
strengthened his power comprehensively (Economy 2014), assumed 
top posts in all state and party apparatus including those on foreign 
affairs (Li 2016), as well as removed constitutional term limits on the 
presidency (Loh 2018a). This represents a significant change from the 
previous two administrations. On that point, Brown observes how 
“Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, maintained a low profile, barely figuring 
in international affairs. His silence […] was infamous” (Brown 2017: 
64). In contrast, he adds that Xi’s leadership is “more willing to speak 
openly about external issues” (Brown 2017: 64). Lampton (2015) 
concludes, meanwhile, that Xi’s decision to create a National Security 
Commission (NSC) in 2013 was a tool to help him better coordinate 
domestic and foreign policy, the upshot of which is that he has “con-
trol over internal security, foreign, and military policy that his prede-
cessor Hu Jintao did not possess” (Lampton 2015: 775).  
Foot (2014) argues that under Xi, China has embraced a more 
activist foreign policy – primarily through the United Nations, via an 
increased budget and greater peacekeeping contributions. This, she 
writes, is a departure from Deng Xiaoping’s “lay low and bide your 
time” (东ݹޫᲖ, tao guang yang hui) dictum that guided the Hu era, as 
China under Xi seeks to become more “globalist” (Foot 2014: 1087). 
Zhang similarly avers that China has become more assertive under Xi 
while at the same time “vigorously seeking to maintain a peaceful 
external environment” (Zhang 2015: 7). Yan (2014) states that Xi’s 
more robust policy allows it to make an increased number of friends 
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and is contributive to China’s rejuvenation project. This, he stresses, 
is achieved through: searching for shared strategic cooperation; plac-
ing morality over economic interests; and, developing nuanced 
friendships with countries depending on the “character of China’s 
relations with that country” (Yan 2014: 170). Disputing the view that 
China’s assertiveness has harmed her national image, Yan insists that 
relations with the United States, European countries, and developing 
nations have improved.  
Ferdinand (2016), in studying Xi’s “China Dream” and its spill-
over effects on foreign policy (particularly the Belt and Road Initia-
tive, BRI – the key enterprise in that external dimension of the China 
Dream), comments that:  
While economic development issues still play a big role in struc-
turing policies, the dream of restoring China to its traditional place 
in world affairs begins to loom over them. (Ferdinand 2016: 956) 
Second, Mao Zedong aside, Xi’s power grab is unprecedented; the 
full effects of it have yet to be understood. It is also apparent that 
foreign policy and diplomatic success appear central to Xi’s power 
consolidation efforts. The 19th Party Congress, for instance, under-
scored the necessity for China’s foreign policy to be more proactive, 
essentially dropping Deng’s mantra of biding one’s time. In fact, the 
emphasis at the 19th Party Congress on China’s international role had 
“never been stated as emphatically nor linked so decisively to China 
having turned a corner toward greatness” (Swaine 2018: 2). In that 
regard, nationalistic appeals to a domestic audience for the purposes 
of international status-signalling cannot be disregard (see Pu 2019). 
This was behind Xi’s and China’s manoeuvres when whipping up 
nationalist feelings as part of registering the country’s displeasure at 
South Korea’s decision to deploy the US’s Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense system in 2017. Thus, we see citizens supporting gov-
ernmental moves to stop tours to South Korea, ban “K-Pop,” and to 
cease buying South Korea-made products – moves that seriously 
undermined South Korean businesses in China (Hancock and Wang, 
2017). The fact that foreign policy success is important to political 
leaders may seem banal, but for Xi foreign affairs are fundamental to 
his domestic rule and legitimacy (e.g. Economy 2018: 64–66). Myriad 
foreign affairs issues – such as the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, 
and the trade war with the US – have important consequences for the 
authority of the Party and the president. 
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On the flip side, there are certain risks in placing so much weight 
on global ambitions.2 Indeed, some of these risks are now manifest-
ing. Take China’s aforementioned grand – but ambiguous – BRI. 
International actors such as Japan, Malaysia, and the European Union 
are already pushing back against it. The EU (minus Hungary), for 
instance, released a statement in April 2018 denouncing the BRI 
(Elmer 2018), while Malaysia’s prime minister sounded a warning on 
how it could be construed as a new form of colonialism (Hornby 
2018). Such pushback, if sustained, could undercut Xi’s domestic 
legitimacy. In that regard, the China–US trade war has had the effect 
of undermining his authority; the Chinese government came under 
intense scrutiny and criticism in 2018, meanwhile (Deng 2019).  
This research adds, then, to the developing literature trying to 
make sense of contemporary Chinese foreign policy under Xi. As this 
scholarship tends to focus on Xi’s control of foreign policy through 
the military and great power politics (e.g. Lampton 2015; Kou 2017), 
this article contributes specifically by analysing instead his control 
over diplomatic actors – which is relatively ignored in the literature. 
Unlike his predecessors, Xi has considerable autonomy to implement 
and achieve his foreign policy objectives. How and in what way has 
Xi “caused” this assertiveness? As pointed out above, the scholarship 
has hitherto linked Xi and China’s military assertiveness together. In 
contrast, there has been little offered on the effects of Xi’s power 
drive on MOFA and on diplomatic actors more generally. Thus, using 
the Chinese case as my foil, I engage with and build on the practice 
turn literature in arguing for more field-theoretic analyses in under-
standing foreign policy. With that aim in mind, mapping the diplo-
matic field in China adds to the international practice literature by 
showing how field theory can be instantiated empirically. 
The article proceeds as follows: First, engaging with the literature 
on practice theory (PT), I make a case for the centrality of “fields” in 
investigating international relations puzzles. Next, I describe how a 
shift in the Chinese domestic diplomatic field has resulted in a corres-
ponding realignment in diplomatic actors’ orientation and practices. 
While doing that, I furnish a way to better use fields as units of analy-
sis – specifically, through the identification of both primary and sec-
ondary actors and via the (hierarchical) mapping of the relationship 

2 I thank one of the reviewers for raising this point. 
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between them. Finally, I illustrate the productive and generative ef-
fects of fields in and of themselves and at the point of overlap and/or 
embeddedness, through examples of transnational field encounters 
and transversal disruptions.  
3UDFWLFHVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQVDQGD6KLIW
LQWKH)LHOG
The turn towards practice starts from the basic assumption that “so-
cial realities – and international politics – are constituted by human 
beings acting in and on the world” (Cornut 2017: 2). Recent practice 
scholarship has demonstrated the value added to the International 
Relations discipline by shifting “our focus from reflective deliberation 
and conscious instrumental and normative decision-making to the 
daily practices of habitual sayings and doings” (Hopf 2018: 687). 
Adler-Nissen (2014) reveals how diplomatic practices that created 
exclusion – namely, the United Kingdom’s and Denmark’s opting out 
of the EU – nevertheless fostered closer ties and integration within 
the EU through the stigmatisation of norm-breakers, and also served 
to reinforce existing norms too. Further, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 
(2014) illustrate how power surfaces in social contexts and how state 
representatives’ social mastery in translating “skills” into power and 
influence proved to be a major factor in the decision to intervene in 
Libya in 2011. Focusing on the distinction between tactical and stra-
tegic practices and the reflective nature of practices, Bode (2018) 
argues meanwhile that agents’ practices through and as UN officials, 
member states, and non-governmental organisations have influenced 
the UN Security Council’s decision-making process. Given the limita-
tions of space, I can only broach the literature on PT here. Suffice to 
say, however, PT has shown its worth when studying IR matters – 
and particularly diplomacy (Pouliot and Cornut 2015: 298). 
Yet, as evinced in the sketch above, most of this scholarship is 
heavily practice-centric, in that it takes practices as its fundamental 
unit of analysis. It is well-noted that “social fields are the macro con-
cept that structure Bourdieu’s thoughts and that represent the entry 
point for Bourdieu’s further concepts” (Walther 2014: 8). Despite its 
importance, ”field” as a theoretical thinking tool has not received due 
attention. Conversely, Adler-Nissen rues how practice scholars tend 
to “read the structuralism side of Bourdieu,” with this representing 
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the risk of “losing the main advantages of the recent ‘turn to practice’ 
[in IR]” (Adler-Nissen 2012: 14) as change and contingency escape 
analysis.  
However, it seems that the reverse is actually happening – we are 
prioritising practices at the expense of other conceptual (structural) 
tools. In that regard, I agree broadly with Hopf – who writes that PT 
scholars of all stripes have largely “ignored the fact that social theo-
ries of practice include reflection in their theorization of goings on in 
the world” (Hopf 2018: 705). Without dismissing the validity of re-
flection and agency in practices, my goal here is to elucidate how we 
can think of change through fields. What is more, while there is noth-
ing to prevent the application of PT to non-Western locations, the 
practice agenda remains firmly in the orbit of European scholars 
concerned with European IR, leading to claims of Eurocentrism in 
PT (Bourbeau 2017: 11–12). Here, I aim to underline Bourdieu’s 
concept of field in understanding diplomacy, highlighting the produc-
tive, generative, and restrictive effects of the field – and the effects 
which come to the fore when fields meet. 
8QGHUVWDQGLQJ)LHOGV
Bourdieu says this of the field:  
In analytical terms, a Àeld can be deÀned as a conÀguration of ob-
jective relations between positions. These positions are deÀned 
objectively in their existence and in the determinations that they 
impose on their occupants, agents or institutions by their current 
and potential situations (situs) in the [wider] structure of the dis-
tribution of different currencies of power (or of capital), posses-
sion of which provides access to speciÀc proÀts that are up for 
grabs in the Àeld, at the same time, by their objective relations to 
other positions (domination, subordination, equivalents and 
soon). (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 20) 
That is to say, a field is a relatively autonomous and hierarchical spa-
tial-social arena where agents vie for resources and benefits while 
occupying positions within this system. It is both material (physical 
artefacts and concrete resources, such as money) and ideational 
(norms and practices of the field, or “competence”). This autonomy, 
however, is never absolute. Cohen explains how  
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all fields are defined by two poles, the heteronomous pole where 
external principles of legitimation are prevalent and the autono-
mous pole where the internal principle of legitimation is prevalent. 
(Cohen 2018: 253) 
This highlights how fields are always subjected to internal and exter-
nal principles, even as the impact of these principles varies. There is a 
shared sense of what rewards, stakes, and capital are useful and at-
tainable. Bourdieu calls this the “doxa,” which is the “immediate 
belief in the facticity of the world that makes us take it for granted” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 73). Bigo further explains how the 
field is not just  
a collective but it is a field of individuals and of the institutions 
they make, as the field will not exist independently of human ac-
tion and reflexivity. (Bigo 2011: 238)  
Thus, one can think of a field as an “arena” wherein actors cooperate 
and compete within a bounded area or formal and informal rules. It is 
revealing to hear what Bicchi and Bremberg write about European 
diplomatic practices and field:  
European diplomacy should first and foremost be understood as a 
field of practice which is not primarily demarked by geography, 
but by what is at stake to the actors involved. (Bicchi and Brem-
berg 2016: 396) 
They further add that:  
This means not only that European diplomacy is fuzzy at its bor-
ders, but also that it makes little sense to distinguish between Eu-
ropean and national practices when it comes to diplomacy and 
foreign policy. (Bicchi and Bremberg 2016: 396)  
While I agree that a field (of practice) is not primarily marked by geog-
raphy, I depart from these two authors in maintaining that it makes 
sense to distinguish between local fields/practices and supranational 
fields/practices. Making this distinction is crucial. While autonomous 
fields overlap and map onto each other, they sometimes misalign too. 
What are the consequences when this happens? As will be clear in my 
case studies, such instances are potentially fertile spaces in which to 
effect change. 
At this point, I need to add a clarification about the relationship 
between “transnational” fields and “transversal” disruption here. 
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Transnational fields refer to those that traverse national boundaries. 
Transversal disruptions meanwhile, as conceived here, are resultant 
effects of overlapping, cross-cutting fields, regardless of national 
boundaries. In this way, for example, while the field of multilateral 
diplomacy is transnational in nature, it retains a transversal quality – 
as it is “inherently intertwined and imbricated with national fields […] 
as well as with transnational fields” (Pouliot 2016: 212). As such, the 
complex, cross-cutting qualities and the effects/disruptions that spring 
from this are best captured with the vocabulary of transversal disrup-
tion. Significantly, not all transnational fields – contra Bourdieu – are 
inherently competitive, bereft of cooperation, or naturally disruptive. 
Thus, the presence of transnational or overlapping fields should not 
be taken as an automatic implication of disruption – even if that pos-
sibility is always present. In the next section, I start with an examina-
tion of the local diplomatic field and describe some of the ways in 
which actors compete and cooperate, before going into the specific 
cases of transversal disruptions. 
&KLQHVH'LSORPDWLF)LHOG
Bigo provides information on quantifying a field:  
To speak about a Àeld supposes that empirical research has been 
carried out, which shows what is speciÀcally at stake in the game 
played by the agents. From this speciÀcity of the stakes involved, 
it is crucial to understand how agents position or distinguish 
themselves in that game, along what lines, what kinds of positions 
are taken in relation to others, and what kind of resources in terms 
of power they can mobilize in order to play. A Àeld also supposes 
a certain period of time for the rules of the game to have an effect 
and to have a certain degree of autonomy. (Bigo 2011: 240) 
In this regard, then, field is not merely a conceptual substitute for 
“context” or “space.” It goes beyond these concepts because it does 
not simply capture “background information” or the local sociocul-
tural milieu, but demands a manifold rendering of social relations 
within and between institutions with its own regulative logic and 
specific historicity – focusing particularly on “struggles” over stakes 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 88–97). My construction of the dip-
lomatic field in China involves three interrelated steps. First, building 
on Bigo and following Bourdieu’s insistence on the relational nature 
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of fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96), I identify the primary 
and secondary players involved in the field. This involves mapping, 
hierarchically, the agents and institutions that constitute these players. 
Done this way, I can study the cooperative and competitive practices 
in the field in relation to MOFA. Second, I draw out the hierarchical 
relations between primary and secondary actors. Third and finally, I 
adumbrate the material/immaterial and normative/institutionalised 
boundaries of the field. Mapping the boundaries of the field is crucial 
to the application of field theory. While Bourdieu stresses how de-
termining the “limits of the field is a very difficult one,” he also adds 
that “the boundaries of the field can only be determined by empirical 
investigation” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 100). He suggests that 
the limits of the field are located “at the point where the effects of 
the field cease,” and that “various means” must be used to measure 
the point at which “these statistically detectable effects decline” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 100). My approach here, then, is to 
identify: (1) the current participants and (2) the limits of their diplo-
matic and foreign policy influence.    
The Chinese diplomatic field is demarcated by MOFA, as the 
central institution; the Central Foreign Affairs Commission; the Polit-
buro Standing Committee (PSC); and, the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA), owing to its defence diplomacy work. Notably, there are sev-
eral secondary actors within the diplomatic field that exercise some 
influence on the foreign policy decision-making process and the exe-
cution of diplomacy; these includes think tanks and (mainly Beijing- 
and Shanghai-based) universities, prominent academics, retired politi-
cians/officials, and media outlets – each with varying degrees of 
prominence and influence. The criteria for assessing who these pri-
mary and secondary actors are remain both subjective and objective: 
They come from subjective self-referentiality (the actors noting their 
own contributions, limitations, and influence) and through objective 
assessment (measurements of direct influence/impact on the field, 
such as adopted policy recommendations and “face time” with 
MOFA and PSC leaders). This is triangulated from third parties in the 
field, wherefrom I draw information on specific actors’ influence and 
practices.  
To locate actors in the field, I first determine what the most im-
portant stake in the field even is. In the Chinese diplomatic one, this 
would be “social capital” (translatable to “economic capital”); in very 
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specific terms: access to and impact on foreign policy and diplomacy. 
To be sure, despite this scoping, the definition of fields remains ulti-
mately ambiguous – a point that I concede. However, it is important 
to remember that the field cannot be reduced to purely objective 
standards because it is, by nature, only an approximation. In particu-
lar, on this point the article pays attention to Jackson’s prodding that 
this “imprecision is worth accepting” so as to derive the “benefits 
that can be gained by thinking about social relations in general, and 
foreign policymaking in particular, in terms of relatively distinct 
‘fields’” (Jackson 2008: 167).  
After determining the stake, I establish the current possession of 
it by actors – which maps into its direct/indirect impact on diploma-
cy. In that way, whether actors are direct organs of the state and Party 
or not determines, for the purposes of external affairs, their rank. 
Attempts by actors to bring themselves closer to the centre of power 
in the diplomatic field can be seen as stake-accumulating activities. 
Moves to set oneself apart from others in the field by establishing a 
direct connection to top policymakers are also seen as hallmarks of 
distinction.  
For example, one academic frequently trots out the lectures that 
he delivered to the PSC. This served as a distinguishing feature of 
him – the person – separate from the institution. Other secondary 
players in the field – particularly think tanks and academics – refer-
ence this scholar: “Advising the top leadership and giving them a 
lecture – that is the highest achievement!” (Anonymous 1 2016, 27 
June). This reinforces not only the acclamation itself but also objecti-
fies it as a valuable stake in the field.  
I now present the process that I used to locate CFAU as a sec-
ondary actor: First, I assess its direct effect on diplomacy. Are their 
views sought by MOFA and PSC? How aligned are they with these 
diplomatic players? I supplement this through field interviews with 
actors who signal their alignment and closeness to MOFA. Objective-
ly, I establish whether those who occupy leadership positions at 
CFAU (its leadership team is staffed with current and former MOFA 
officials) are directly linked to MOFA, and how some scholars also 
take up positions within MOFA itself (an infrequent occurrence). 
Finally, this account is corroborated by three other sources – staff at 
MOFA, interviewees from Renmin University, and interlocutors from 
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Peking University. Piecing it all together, I thus categorise primary 
and secondary actors in the following way: 
7DEOH3ULPDU\DQG6HFRQGDU\$FWRUV
Primary Actors Secondary Actors 
PSC Retired officials 
MOFA Think tanks 
Central Foreign Affairs Commission Key universities 
PLA Academics 
International Liaison Department of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Media and “public opinion” 
Retired officials are influential because they usually remain active in 
an unofficial “semi-retired” role, either within former or new units. 
These include, among others, Zhu Chenghu (former PLA), Yao Yun-
zhu (former PLA), Yang Yi (former PLA Navy), Sha Zhukang (for-
mer Chinese ambassador to the UN), Wu Sike (former special envoy 
on Middle East Affairs), and Yu Hongjun (former ambassador). Re-
garding think tanks, the most influential are the China Institute for 
International Strategic Studies, the Chinese Academy of Military Sci-
ences of the PLA, the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 
the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the China Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, and the China Foundation for International Studies 
(see also, Zhao 2012: 128–129; Glaser 2012: 92–93).  
Regarding key universities, the ones identified here are CFAU, 
Renmin University, Tsinghua University, Peking University, Beijing 
Foreign Studies University, Fudan University, and Shanghai Jiaotong 
University. Regarding academics, these individuals are usually affiliat-
ed with the influential diplomatic think tanks and universities. Aca-
demics count among their ranks Chinese scholars respected both 
domestically and internationally. These include individuals like Yan 
Xuetong (Tsinghua University), Gao Fei (CFAU), Ruan Zhongzhe 
(China Institute of International Studies), Yang Jiemian (Shanghai 
Institutes for International Studies, SIIS), Chen Dongxiao (SIIS), Qin 
Yaqing (CFAU), Shi Yinghong (Renmin University), and Wang Jisi 
(Peking University) among others. With regard to the media, the 
more influential outlets are identified as China Central Television, the 
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Global Times, Xinhua, People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and China Daily. Final-
ly, it might seem odd to include “public opinion” because, unlike the 
other inclusions here, it is obviously not an actor. Nonetheless, dip-
lomatic officials, PSC leaders, and secondary actors frequently refer-
ence public opinion as a force in restraining and affecting China’s 
diplomacy and foreign policy (Anonymous 2 2017; Anonymous 7 
2017). 
Figure 1 below portrays the hierarchical relations wherein the ac-
tor closest to the core has the largest effect on diplomacy: 
)LJXUH 9LVXDO5HSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH'LSORPDWLF)LHOGLQ&KLQD

6RXUFH $XWKRU¶VRZQHODERUDWLRQ
This chart is an ideal-type, and should not be taken to map unerringly 
into the “reality” of the field. In that regard, while I identify specific 
actors and institutions, the ones listed for each category are not ex-
haustive. The chart illustrates, rather, only who the typical, main ac-
tors are in each category. Furthermore, fields are always shifting and 
players move about within their games. For instance, while different 
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academics and think tanks have varying influence on diplomacy, they 
are, nevertheless, grouped together in the diagram to locate them 
within the field in a general way for the sake of clarity. Therefore, the 
composition of the field here automatically results in a static snapshot 
of it because of the temporal-spatial limits of the research.  
Having mapped out the local diplomatic field, I turn my atten-
tion now to the empirical analysis. How does a shift in the carrots 
and sticks of the field affect primary and secondary players? I argue 
that three interconnecting processes of selection and socialisation, 
restriction, and displays of fealty are at work vis-à-vis primary and 
secondary actors in the field of diplomacy. 
3UHVLGHQW;L7DNHV&RQWURO
When Xi first took power in 2012, hopes were placed in the president 
being a liberal reformist (Branigan 2012). Those hopes were dashed 
as Xi undertook sweeping reforms, including his much-publicised 
anti-corruption drive, consolidating and strengthening his power 
further (Economy 2014). Xi’s disquiet over his predecessor’s foreign 
policy was obvious; Lampton mentions how the new president 
“doesn’t sound like someone fully satisfied with the foreign policy 
and domestic security policy-making processes that he inherited” 
(Lampton 2015: 762). Previous administrations largely stuck to 
Deng’s aforementioned biding your time directive. Under Xi, how-
ever, this changed to “striving and doing something” (ཻਁᴹѪ, fen fa 
you wei) – lending itself to a more activist and globalist diplomacy for 
the country.  
Part of this drive to impose his vision of foreign policy means Xi 
exerting control over MOFA, as well as the relevant key players in the 
Chinese diplomatic field. In that regard, Xi’s reorganisation of the 
Central Foreign Affairs Leading (Small) Group to the institutionally 
more important Central Foreign Affairs Commission in March 2018 
is reflective of his ongoing desire to “upgrade” China’s diplomatic 
apparatus. Looking at his speeches, we can certainly observe how Xi’s 
personality and thinking shaped his world view. Indeed, Lam’s (2016) 
analysis of Xi’s speeches – in contrast to those of Hu and Jiang Ze-
min – points very clearly to a discernible shift from the thinking of 
previous administrations. For example, Xi’s discourse and ideology  
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perpetuate the CCP’s status as “perennial ruling party.” When Hu 
Jintao was state vice-president and president of the Central Party 
School (CPS) (1998 to 2002), the fourth-generation leader asked 
scholars and specialists at the CPS and other think tanks to exam-
ine a plethora of evergreen parties in the world—and to see what 
the CCP could learn from them. (Lam 2016: 411) 
He and Feng (2013) reach a similar conclusion in their analysis of Xi’s 
speeches. They observe that while Xi’s world view shares similarities 
with Hu’s, the former is inclined towards an international strategy 
that is more assertive. At any rate, in the diplomatic field, Xi’s power-
accretion efforts have resulted in a subsequent shift of the field 
(structure) itself. Hence, I have attempted to tease out these structural 
effects – which, subsequently, filtered downstream to diplomatic 
actors. The following sections will detail some of these effects. 
6HOHFWLRQDQG6RFLDOLVDWLRQ
MOFA personnel are drawn mainly from the top universities in Bei-
jing and Shanghai – mostly Peking University, Tsinghua University, 
CFAU, and Beijing Foreign Studies University, owing to its language 
training. First, students from these universities (and across the coun-
try) are drawn into the foreign service through the annual civil service 
examination. Second, CFAU (and to a limited extent Peking and 
Tsinghua Universities) supplies a significant portion of its top stu-
dents to the ministry. This is done in two ways. The first involves 
faculty members identifying suitable candidates and submitting a list 
of around 30 names a year to MOFA, who will then proceed to place 
them after the necessary tests and training (Anonymous 1 2016, 13 
August). Second, MOFA would, from time to time, give CFAU a 
quota – for example “10 males, 2 females” – to fill. Finally, unique to 
CFAU and some academics from influential think tanks, those who 
are senior enough and deemed good enough have the opportunity to 
“transfer” to MOFA while retaining the option of heading back to 
academia after working at the ministry for three to five years (Glaser 
2012: 133; Bondiguel and Kellner 2010: 9).  
Those deemed unworthy are weeded out via the selection pro-
cess. One academic who was seconded to Japan said: “The embassy 
thought I had something to contribute through my participation in 
conferences and writing reports” (Anonymous 2 2017). This “good 
enough” quality does not simply refer to capabilities but also political 
  126 Dylan M. H. Loh 

discipline and policy orientation. This does not mean, however, there 
are no disagreements – they happen often, but within limits. The 
same academic noted: “We do have disagreements but on nothing 
fundamental or anything too critical,” further adding that “once a 
decision is made [...] we must support it and we most definitely can-
not write [anything bad about it] or go public disagreeing [with it]” 
(Anonymous 2 2017). 
“The first quality that the MOFA looks for is loyalty, political 
loyalty” (Anonymous 3 2016), noted one MOFA aspirant who failed 
to get through to the latter stages of the selection process. He added 
that while grades are important, they are somewhat secondary to 
one’s political leanings and discipline in obeying and following orders. 
While this was always the case, he stressed how this has increasingly 
become a key criterion under Xi. This account was corroborated by a 
MOFA source who noted that: “Of course one’s political loyalty and 
discipline is one of the most important considerations.” He added 
that there is no shortage of talent to promote nor is there any short-
age of people applying to MOFA; thus, loyalty is a key consideration 
(Anonymous 4 2018).  
This is not to be understood merely as loyalty to one’s country, 
but also as a kind of political loyalty. In that regard, when an agent 
enters the institution where they will henceforth work, the socialisa-
tion process accelerates. The learning of what is “right and wrong,” 
the “dos and dont’s,” is well documented in socialisation theory 
(Clausen 1968). Bourdieu (1984) himself wrote extensively on the 
reproduction of social structures in schools, and notes how agents are 
socialised and learn through “institutional inculcation” and training. 
Suffice to say, the socialisation process that agents are put through in 
MOFA and indeed the entire diplomatic apparatus under Xi enjoins, 
as a Southeast Asian diplomat put it, such individuals: “To be firm 
and to be able to get their message across very forcefully and skilful-
ly.” This diplomat also observed how: “There is an ongoing emphasis 
to professionalise MOFA more under Xi. He needs to rely on MOFA 
more for his foreign policy vision” (Anonymous 5 2017). 
5HVWULFWLRQ
Beyond restrictions on their movements, public disclosures, and 
friends, agents are also advised not to participate in alumni meetings 
and not to meet with foreigners unless on official business. They are 
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not allowed (as is the case for civil servants in China) to travel abroad 
for personal reasons, and their non-diplomatic passport is held onto 
by the state. This restriction of speech, body, and relations was most 
pronounced in 2016 and particularly 2017 in the lead up to the 19th 
Party Congress. One Chinese interlocutor, a secondary actor, told me 
how the atmosphere is “more restrictive now than before” (Anonym-
ous 10 2017).  
Meeting diplomats, researchers, and reporters is part of normal 
diplomatic activity. In China, however, foreign ministry personnel are 
not allowed to meet individually with visitors; they must meet in at 
least pairs (Anonymous 9 2016; Anonymous 6 2018). This practice 
departs from that of most other countries, where diplomats are free 
to have one-to-one meetings. Speaking from experience, it is only 
with Chinese diplomats that I have encountered situations where 
there at least one other person present. There are several reasons for 
this, chief among them preventing wayward messaging, keeping up 
surveillance and restricting the movements and utterances of agents. 
A North American envoy noted: “We simply cannot be friends with 
them, not for want of trying but it is just not possible” (Anonymous 
15 2017). This was substantiated by other diplomatic actors, who saw 
a “friendship problem” as being particularly acute with the Chinese. 
A European diplomat recalled how he invited his Chinese counter-
part for dinner at home and, to his surprise, the latter turned up with 
a couple of other colleagues dressed and behaving in a very “officious 
manner” – turning what was intended to be a friendly, private inter-
action into one that was semi-official, if not entirely official (Ano-
nymous 8 2016). By way of comparison to the past, one Common-
wealth diplomat recollected that:  
When I was in the UN in New York in 1998, the Chinese diplo-
mats were very friendly to me. I was particularly close to this cur-
rent high-ranking diplomat. Close on a very personal level, where 
he would ask their friends and family to host me. In fact, I would 
even bring stuff from their family to them and vice versa when I 
went to Beijing. He and his wife would come to my house very of-
ten too! Back then, the junior ministers from China very happily 
accepted our beer and food in our homes. Maybe they were very 
deprived, so with some food and drinks, they become very grate-
ful! [laughs]. (Anonymous 16 2018) 
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'LVSOD\VRI)HDOW\
During a meeting, Geng Shuang – one of MOFA’s spokespersons – 
was asked how the outside world should understand the sometimes 
opaque Chinese foreign ministry. He replied: “Study the Communist 
Party, and you will understand China; and you will understand the 
Foreign Ministry” (Personal communication, 2017). Yang Jiechi, one 
of China’s most important foreign policy figures had to pen a long 
op-ed piece praising Xi Jinping’s thought on diplomacy. Yang was 
fulsome in his emphasising of how the president had “great foresight 
and a comprehensive perspective” and that “General Secretary Xi 
Jinping’s thought on diplomacy is a comprehensive and profound 
system of theories with rich connotations” (Zhang 2017). Wang Yi, 
MOFA’s foreign minister, was equally effusive in his praise in his 
own essay, writing that Xi’s diplomatic thought “also innovates upon 
and transcends the past 300 years of traditional Western international 
relations theory” while dubbing him a “reformer and a pioneer” 
(Martina, Blanchard, and Birsel 2017: paragraph 5). 
Already, the president has installed key allies to important posts 
and removed people with links to either Jiang or Hu through either 
retirement or corruption purges. Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Sun 
Zhengcai, Xu Caihou, and Guo Boxiong, to name but a few, are sen-
ior party cadres who have been purged as part of his anti-corruption 
drive. They were also senior party members who have not previously 
clearly displayed personal loyalty to Xi. This is not to say that the 
failure to pledge loyalty is the reason for political purges, but merely 
to draw attention to the importance of such pledges and how they 
may have a bearing on one’s political future. Under Xi, the field has 
shifted such that tribute-paying has become established practice (Lau 
2015). Beyond written words and speeches, actors are expected to 
embody this new spirit. Diplomats frequently cite their subordination 
to Xi and the Party. Whenever questions of decision-making in for-
eign policy come up, answers invariably end with “the president is the 
decision maker.”  
This does not, however, mean that there are no contending voices, 
or that MOFA has little influence. If anything, because of Xi, MOFA 
has grown bolder, more assertive, and more proactive in its diplomat-
ic endeavours. This increased pace of praise has been quite clear; in 
2012 to 2013, reference to Xi was not so apparent. Around 2014 to 
2015, attributions to and praise of Xi started appearing during work 
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meetings (when I was based at a Singapore think tank) with Chinese 
interlocutors. Subsequently, in 2016 (when he was named “core” of 
the party) and 2017 Xi was ever-present in discussions on Chinese 
foreign policy, reflected also in MOFA-sponsored publications. For 
example the book བྷഭཆӔ(Da guo wai jiao, Big Power Diplomacy) (Bian 
2018), obtained from MOFA, is fundamentally about Xi’s words and 
thoughts, rather than a concrete exposition of Chinese diplomacy. 
This is symptomatic of the other books institutionally underwritten 
by MOFA, and their increasing accreditation of Xi (e.g. Department 
of Policy Planning 2018). 
As a central player in the field, the accentuated control of 
MOFA results in more discipline in the practices by the ministry – 
ones that incentivise activism and assertiveness, and dissuade “weak-
ness.” This has some related knock-on effects for the secondary play-
ers. First, the scope of what they can say and do has been curtailed. 
Whether self-disciplining or otherwise, secondary actors have exhibit-
ed an increasing tendency to restrict information – but this is always 
delicately balanced with a desire to fill the gap that is left by official 
MOFA sources and meetings being much harder to secure. Second, 
and following on from my earlier contention, despite these restric-
tions secondary diplomatic actors have greater freedom of movement 
and speech compared to primary ones. This situation has not depart-
ed greatly from that of the past. What has shifted, however, is the 
amount of ostensible deference to President Xi and to primary actors 
such as MOFA. Secondary actors’ access to social capital (as noted, 
the most important stake in the diplomatic field), inside information, 
and to policymakers/leaders has been cut – alongside their opinions 
no longer being heard, either. Their subjection to the primary actors 
in the local field continues to be entrenched. Paradoxically, however, 
as access to official players such as MOFA diminishes, secondary 
players can positively position themselves to carve out niches.  
7UDQVQDWLRQDO)LHOGVDQG7UDQVYHUVDO
'LVUXSWLRQV
It has already been observed that fields can overlap, and thus are 
imbricated with one another (Adler-Nissen 2011; Bigo 2011). This 
imbrication, however, has not often been looked at by PT scholars. 
One exception is Mérand’s (2010) study on the genesis of the Euro-
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pean Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Challenging constructivist 
and realist accounts of the ESDP, Mérand deployed Bourdieu’s con-
cepts of “habitus,” field, and “crisis” – in the form of external shocks – 
in putting forth a more nuanced account of the ESDP. He observed 
that there are two fields:  
The European foreign policy field, where in EU diplomats vie for 
influence over EU policies, and what I call the “international de-
fense field,” centered upon military relations within NATO.  
(Mérand 2010: 343)  
Mérand concerns himself with the institutionalisation and socialisa-
tion of the field and its structures into individuals’ habitus, and the 
subsequent effects hereof. My concern here, however, is with the 
field itself, and the effects when: (1) changes takes place within it and 
(2) fields overlap. A deeply sociological view of institutions generally 
suggests a dynamic approach being taken to transnational fields. It 
highlights how inter- and transnational fields from time to time func-
tion as catalysts for significant changes, ones that would often be 
entirely politically unachievable on the national level – where such 
strategies are much more constrained by formalised politics and insti-
tutional frameworks (Madsen 2016: 18). Adler-Nissen argues that the 
transnational diplomatic field structures actors, calling it a “meta-
field”:  
When national representatives meet, be it in multilateral and bilat-
eral contexts, the state is no longer the structuring and dominant 
field of power as is the case in Bourdieu’s work. Rather, it is a dis-
tinct field where they meet that structures their positions. (Adler-
Nissen 2011: 328)  
But let us also not forget that while the transnational diplomatic field 
is structuring, it is simultaneously being structured as well. While 
most scholars looked at it as a structuring force, it is more precise to 
see it, in fact, as dynamic: as both object and subject of structure. 
Having described the in-field shifts and the corresponding adjust-
ments in actors’ actions, I turn my attention now to addressing the 
question of “field encounters” – illustrated via concrete cases where 
fields meet, and supported by my observations from interviews with 
diplomatic actors in China.  
Many scholars look at field movements from the perspective of 
actors “leaving,” and then “entering” another field instead. This dis-
  Diplomatic Control, Foreign Policy, and Change 131 

sonance, they argue, creates an impact on the actor and their actions. 
In contrast, I suggest that actors never completely enter or leave a 
field; rather, they are more or less situated in a relatively stable field 
and do not “break in/out” of – as the lexicon of entering and leaving 
suggests. Rather, actors are always enfolded in layers of fields, some 
of which are always stronger than most others – and that provides 
the girth for structural stability. That said, this constancy can be dis-
turbed when fields come into contact. Häkli puts it thus: 
Arguably, it is precisely this aspect of field theory in the study of 
transnational processes that should be developed further. Instead 
of looking at how the national and international fields “overlap” or 
“interact,” it is important to employ field theory to account for 
what dynamisms are at play in the emerging transnational realm of 
social thought and action, and how these processes relate to the na-
tion-state as (one significant) context of action. (Häkli 2013: 347) 
How, then, can we understand the transnational diplomatic field? 
Bourdieu stresses how fields can be used “at different levels of aggre-
gation,” from one construction firm to the “housing economy” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 102; Bourdieu 1990). In this way, it is 
natural, then, that the transnational space represents an upward ag-
gregation of the state-bound field. Thus, like local fields, it has its 
own structural logics, boundaries (although fuzzier), primary and 
secondary actors (although less anchored), and carries generative 
effects (on and in practice). I will highlight these effects in the trans-
national diplomatic space, where the primary players are the institu-
tional and human participants of the represented countries; the sec-
ondary ones, meanwhile, are policymakers, academics, and think 
tanks. Key to power relations though, as I will demonstrate in my 
cases, is that China as an actor is hierarchically better placed than 
others in the transnational diplomatic field. Further, in the transna-
tional field there is no arbiter in the sense that the state (and Party in 
China) can meta-define various capitals, meaning that the stakes are 
much more fluid and contested.  
5XOHVRIWKH*DPH
Bourdieu sees the field as a universe that institutions and individuals 
relate to and integrate with related rules (re̖gles). While fields are rela-
tively autonomous, Walther writes that Bourdieu  
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also qualifies that the autonomy is only relative, as fields are em-
bedded in a social space. For instance, the intellectual field may al-
so be influenced by the politic, the economy or religion. (Walther 
2014: 8) 
This is an important observation, because fields affect each other; 
more so closely related, embedded ones such as the diplomatic field. 
How should we understand re̖gles? Here I will simply refer to them as 
the “field rules.” Unfortunately, many scholars have obfuscated and 
conflated “stakes,” “illusio,” “rules of the game,” and “doxa.” Here, it 
is most instructive to hear Bourdieu’s elucidation of these concepts: 
We have stakes (enjeux) which are for the most part the product of 
the competition between players. We have an investment in the game, 
illusio (from ludus, the game): players are taken in by the game, they 
oppose one another, sometimes with ferocity, only to the extent 
that they concur in their belief (doxa) in the game and its stakes; 
they grant these a recognition that escapes questioning. Players 
agree, by the mere fact of playing, and not by way of a “contract,” 
that the game is worth playing, that it is “worth the candle,” and 
this collusion is the very basis of their competition. (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 98) 
Field rules do not conform neatly to illusio, as the latter talks about 
actors’ commitment to the game. Nor are they exactly about doxa – 
the presuppositions and beliefs in the game and stake itself. 
Wacquant (2011) further observes that these rules are not formal but 
tacit; yet, this does not mean that they cannot be formalistic. Indeed, 
many of them are formal. Hence, field rules rest on a dialectical rela-
tionship between the formalised and tacit.  
In the forthcoming examples, I show how it is not the stakes 
that have changed, nor the illusio that has weakened, nor that actors 
have given up on the doxa of the game; rather, the field has had its 
rules altered. This modification does not necessarily (and often does 
not) result in abandonment or lessen their participation in the field. 
To wit, when actors shift between layers of fields, their movement is 
not clean nor tidy insofar as they “bring” their local field with them. 
That is to say, the local field is embedded in them, as they themselves 
are embedded in the local field. Likewise, the institutionalised intern-
al/external structures, informal and formal practices, artefacts, imma-
terial and material resources carried literally and figuratively in their 
conduct and practices only make sense in the context of the field. 
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Actors are never simply actors, but actors on and of something. The 
field carries them, and they too carry the field with them.  
7UDQVYHUVDO'LVUXSWLRQ
Disruptions always have an element of surprise that departs or does 
not comport with taken-for-granted assumptions and field rules. 
These disruptions, I argue, do not necessarily need to come in the 
form of crisis, nor is a “change in practice by practice” (Hopf 2018: 
692–693) – as some PT scholars note. Instead, it is where rules are 
disrupted and subsequently altered to bring about a shift – but not 
one extensive enough to represent a rupture. I argue that when dis-
ruption happens, there are four possible effects: alignment, resistance, 
status quo maintenance, and reinforcement. This is demonstrated by 
three cases that highlight the potential disruptive effects ensuing 
when fields meet: the multilateral Track II diplomacy field; China–
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) multilateral fields; 
and, the China–Malaysia bilateral field. 
'LVUXSWLRQDQG$OLJQPHQW
In a Track II meeting in 2013, a Chinese delegate – a secondary dip-
lomatic player (think tank affiliate and academic) – during one of his 
lunch breaks tore the page off all 18 member-countries’ booklets on 
which “Taiwan” was listed as a participant. Members returned to 
some shock, but stopped short of punishing the Chinese delegate. In 
fact, it was the Chinese delegates who intimated strongly that they 
would not tolerate any such “formal” reference to Taiwan again. Chi-
na’s unhappiness and anger over the officialisation of Taiwan is well 
known; this anger, however, has become more pronounced, as pri-
mary and secondary actors become more emboldened and are further 
routinised into this ritual following Xi’s taking over.  
Recalling this incident to a Chinese diplomatic contact, he opin-
ed that the way the delegate did this was “not right” but nevertheless 
there was “nothing fundamentally wrong with their action” (Ano-
nymous 11 2016). It is also important to observe that while their 
unorthodox approach was aimed at changing a practice in the field, 
they nonetheless respected the logic of that space in how they wished 
to see such changes made. The same contact thus added:  
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We were not going to say that we are going to withdraw if changes 
are not made. Of course, we valued our participation and the or-
ganisation. We still need to play by the rules of that organisation. (Ano-
nymous 11 2016; italics added for emphasis)  
In this example, the secondary actors – through the highly visible act 
of disruption – caused a shift in the field that resulted in a subsequent 
change of field rules. This shift made the transnational Track II dip-
lomatic field more aligned with the Chinese local one. The conse-
quence of that episode was that regulations were tweaked such that 
Taiwan can now only be referred to as “Chinese Taipei.” The island 
nation is not given a seat at the table (literally), and can only partici-
pate as observers. This has left a lasting impact through the changing 
of both formal rules (procedures and regulations regarding Taiwan as 
a participant) and informal rules (micro-level aggression/shaming of 
Taiwanese participants).  
The change of the field rules in this transversal space, engen-
dered by Chinese actors, thus has chilling effects for Taiwan’s future 
participation in such events. In this context, countries are also com-
pelled to make clear their “One China” position; simultaneously, 
micro-level aggression by Chinese officials/semi-officials against 
Taiwanese representatives continues to be reinforced and legitimised. 
In this way, we observe how a change in the field rules led to a con-
sequent change in practices. Yet, the structure of the field itself was 
first changed through the practices of the Chinese actors who relied 
on their own field operative logic. This example thus illuminates both 
the “structuring” and “structured” nature of fields acutely. A second-
ary Chinese diplomatic player recounted: “We have to push for our 
interests. We have so many interests in the world. This is nothing 
special or shocking. It is very normal” (Anonymous 17 2017). In any 
event, he also admitted that:  
We have our own way of doing things, and we bring that into the 
international arena. Sometimes, others disagree. But we are also 
aware in these places, we cannot just follow our own way all the 
time. (Anonymous 17 2017) 
From the Chinese perspective, then, a tension exists in such spaces. 
On the one hand, there is a natural inclination (informed by the 
country’s own field logic and practices) to bring their operating as-
sumptions and practices into this transnational space, yet there re-
mains also a self-awareness that the transnational location is “differ-
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ent” from the local diplomatic field and cannot be treated as such. An 
important point to stress here, in this Track II diplomacy space, is 
that China frequently pulls diplomatic levers in such a way that it has 
a knock-on effect on “official diplomacy.”  
'LVUXSWLRQDQG5HVLVWDQFH
Another important transnational site is the China–ASEAN field 
wherein most of the related diplomatic activity happens. In that way, 
one sees intensified attempts to change the formal and informal field 
rules; in several sites, this is met with resistance however. Take the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 
July 2012. Upon the conclusion of this meeting, a regular joint com-
muniqué failed to be issued. Commentators attributed this to the 
“spoiler role” that Cambodia played in disrupting the joint communi-
qué – an outcome actively sought after by China (Loh 2018b). Fast 
forward four years to 2016, and a similar incident took place during 
the special China–ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Kunming, 
China. A strongly worded statement on the South China Sea was first 
released by Malaysia near the conclusion of the meeting. Less than 
three hours later it was cancelled, as Cambodia and Laos prevented 
the release of it. As co-chair, Singapore’s foreign minister left the 
meeting before it concluded. In the aftermath, Liu Zhenmin, China’s 
vice foreign minister, remarked that Singapore should “butt out” of 
the South China Sea issue. It was revealed that during the China–
ASEAN Kunming meeting, Chinese diplomats were going around 
warning representatives from the other countries not to make refer-
ences to the South China Sea – giving rise to ASEAN diplomats’ 
frustrations (Parameswaran 2016). China was insisting on ASEAN 
signing up to its statement or issuing nothing at all. Such meddling 
departs from “normal” diplomatic practice, and certainly does not fit 
into the transversal ASEAN field that valorises the “ASEAN way”: 
consensus-seeking, informality, non-interference, and respect for 
sovereignty. China’s visible and invisible interference disrupted these 
much-vaunted ASEAN practices and rules. 
In interviews with Southeast Asian diplomats, Chinese officials’ 
behaviour was often referred to as “undiplomatic.” “Within ASEAN, 
disagreements were plenty and these are fiercely contested – but there 
would still be mutual respect, give-and-take” noted one ASEAN dip-
lomat (Anonymous 12 2017). Crucially, however, these diplomats 
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remarked that ASEAN members have come to expect such behav-
iour as it now undergoes a process of normalisation. Yet resistance 
from countries such as Singapore and Indonesia, as well as ASEAN 
itself, has been crucial in preventing further alignment with the Chi-
nese diplomatic field. Singapore, for example, highlighted ASEAN’s 
central role on the South China Sea issue (arguing against bilateral-
ism), and also made its most public and forceful message yet in 2016 
by singling out China (National Day Rally 2016). Indonesia too has 
resisted, for example by firing live rounds at Chinese vessels en-
croaching on its waters (Sands 2016), renaming part of the South 
China Sea the “North Natuna Sea” (Allard and Munthe 2017), and, 
more significantly, insisting that ASEAN needs to have a common 
agreement and joint stance on the South China Sea issue (Gutierrez 
2017). There is thus a fight over ASEAN statements’ wording when 
reference to the South China Sea is made. For instance, in 2016 and 
2017 the usually strong language in ASEAN chairman and foreign 
ministerial statements was watered down through the removal of all 
references to the South China Sea; yet in 2018, these made a reap-
pearance:  
[…] concerns on the land reclamations and activities in the area, 
which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and 
may undermine peace, security, and stability in the region. 
(ASEAN 2018)  
Have there, then, been any lasting changes in the ASEAN field? 
There have indeed been some such shifts – ones not tectonic, but not 
insignificant either. First, the “rules of the game” – both the formal 
and informal ones – are now increasingly being contested, challenged, 
and weakened in this field. But, there is some resistance too. The act 
of resisting clarifies what the field rules are: what exactly does the 
ASEAN way connote, how to practice it, and how important it truly 
is. K. Shanmugam, then Singapore’s foreign minister, maintained that 
ASEAN must keep speaking up on the South China Sea issue and not 
be silenced; otherwise, “if Asean keeps quiet and loses credibility, it 
would not be in China’s interest” (Chang 2014: paragraph 2). It is this 
ongoing self-reflective resistance that is preventing the widening of 
cracks into fissures (Loh 2018b). For now, the rules of the ASEAN 
field have not changed – but if China is able to bring more countries 
into its orbit, (as Cambodia and Laos already are) the chances of ma-
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terial and immaterial changes to the ASEAN field are high. One 
Southeast Asian diplomat noted that:  
It is not in China’s interest to split up ASEAN for good, but they 
are certainly prepared, under Xi, to push ASEAN very hard with-
out too much care for ASEAN itself. (Anonymous 13 2017) 
Beyond the multilateral arena, we also see other instances – for ex-
ample, in the bilateral transnational field – where Chinese diplomatic 
practices creep in. Taking the China–Malaysia bilateral relationship as 
an illustrative case, two concrete examples spring to mind. The first is 
the apparent interference of the former Chinese ambassador, Huang 
Huikang, in Malaysia’s domestic politics in 2015. In that incident, he 
appeared in an ethnically Chinese street in Malaysia when pro- and 
anti-government protests were raging owing to the 1MDB scandal. 
During his visit, ahead of a planned pro-government rally, he warned 
that: 
Beijing would not fear speaking out against incidents which 
threaten the interests of the country, infringe upon the rights of its 
citizens in doing business, or disrupt the relationship between Ma-
laysia and China. (Tariq and Chan 2015: paragraph 3) 
This was widely seen as meddling in the domestic affairs of Malaysia, 
particularly by stoking up pro-Chinese sentiments during a particular-
ly sensitive period for racial tensions. After being summoned by the 
Malaysian Foreign Ministry to provide clarification, Huang aides  
told them he was very busy, and demanded instead that the For-
eign Ministry officers instead go to the embassy to see him. Huang 
then went on to lobby Ong Ka Ting, Malaysia’s special envoy to 
China, and several other ministers, who reportedly let him off the 
hook. (Parameswaran 2015: paragraph 5)  
Next, in the Malaysian general election of 2018, it was observed that 
the Chinese ambassador, Bai Tian, campaigned for the incumbent 
candidate, Liow Tiong Lai, from the Malaysian Chinese Association 
(MCA) – which formed a major component of the then-ruling coali-
tion Barisan Nasional. The Chinese ambassador was a constant pres-
ence at Liow’s and the ruling administration’s campaign rallies (Xi’s 
image even appeared on MCA’s campaign posters), leading to mur-
murs that Beijing was openly supporting the pro-China Najib admin-
istration (Ho 2018). Their gambit backfired. Mahathir Mohamad’s 
Pakatan Harapan coalition emerged as the new government after the 
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election, and he moved swiftly to cancel the China-backed USD 20 
billion East Coast Rail Link project and a natural gas pipeline project 
in Sabah, citing the unfair nature of the deal (Lahiri 2018). Mahathir 
also sounded a warning against “a new version of colonialism” in a 
thinly veiled reference to China made during a state visit to Beijing 
(Hornby 2018: paragraph 1).  
When I suggested to a Chinese diplomatic source that China’s 
moves in Malaysia can be seen as interference, he was self-exculpa-
tory: “This is being misunderstood. We always insist on non-interfer-
ence. It is normal that China grows, and we have more resources, we 
expand and protect these” (Anonymous 18 2018). He also brushed 
off Malaysia’s moves, saying:  
No, this is not a reaction to the so-called interference or “debt 
trap.” First, there is no such thing. Next, it is their negotiating 
tactic for the East Coast Rail Link. (Anonymous 18 2018)  
What was left unsaid, of course, was that China has materially grown 
for decades, while the recent assertive turn has become most appar-
ent over the last 10 years. As such, more pertinently, this diplomatic 
assertive turn has been only a recent development – and one directly 
coinciding with Xi’s efforts to exert full control.  
&RQFOXVLRQ
In furthering the agenda of the practice turn, scholars have utilised 
Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, doxa, illusion, and practices to 
fruitfully study, as well as open up new avenues of research in, IR. 
However, within the central toolkit of ideas, the notion of the field 
has – comparatively speaking – been left out in the cold. I suggest 
that field-sensitive accounts can help advance the practice turn pro-
ject.  
Using China as the foil, I first described the contemporary Chi-
nese diplomatic field. To that end, I gave a relational account of how 
fields can be identified, marked out, and analysed. Next, I catalogued 
the shifts taking place within the field and how this has resulted in a 
correspondent and constant realignment of actors. Finally, I intro-
duced the idea of transversal disruption and outlined what this entails 
when fields overlap.  
Empirically, I demonstrated how Xi’s quest for control in foreign 
policy has tweaked the local diplomatic field’s incentives and structure. 
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This change has given rise to bolder, more proactive actors – and, 
consequently, diplomacy. Lastly, I argued how disruption and change 
can happen in transnational diplomatic fields.  
The results have been mixed for China; in some arenas they have 
met with success, in others with strong resistance. Significantly, the 
Chinese diplomatic field itself has not been successfully challenged or 
resisted to such an extent to cause them to reflect or rethink their 
own rules and incentives – even as countries such as Australia and 
New Zealand now actively resist China’s diplomatic “overreach” and 
purported campaigns of influence. Yet, the Chinese diplomatic field 
is such that no one would want to be the “bearer of bad news” and 
bring this up to the top leadership, as an East Asian diplomat ex-
plained (Anonymous 14 2017). When fields meet or are at the point 
of overlap, something happens. That “something” has long been 
neglected by practice scholars. I have sought to demonstrate how it 
matters, is productive, and has generative effects – while also holding 
potential for international political change too.   
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